Analysis
by YIANNIS MAVRIS
New Democracy one year after elections
In May 2012, New Democracy’s share of the vote (18.85%) proved to be the lowest ever received by the main party of the Right in Greece. But the crushing of PASOK was no less important than this crisis of the Right. It was clear that the Memorandum had deeply divided the conservative party too, a development of enormous political importance.
The conservative bloc emerged from the first poll geographically, socially, politically and ideologically fragmented. Its three main ideological currents (figuratively speaking, the ‘popular right’, the ‘far right’ and the ‘neoliberal right’) were now dispersed and represented by seven party formations. The social dimension of this fragmentation can be seen in the electoral map of the capital (figure 1).
From the fragmentation of the Right to the conservative backlash
Antonis Samaras’ position as party leader was indeed threatened… for a few days. However, within the ranks of conservative political forces, the prospect of ND breaking up was viewed as tantamount to self-destruction and was eventually averted. The erroneous pre-election assessments as to the ‘durability’ of the two-party system and the unexpected rise of the Left caused profound concern amongst the ruling elite and led to an unprecedented class backlash. First of all, a ‘holy alliance’ was forged against SYRIZA. On account of this backlash, ND de facto became the main core of the opposite pole formed to counter the ‘red threat’.
Thus, in the repeat elections of 17 June, ND too managed to significantly increase its voter support, by 11 percentage points (29.7%, 1.8 million votes) and with an additional 170,000 votes win the elections. This time, ND attracted mainly conservative voters who in the first contest had opted for smaller parties of the neoliberal right (Democratic Alliance, ReCreate Greece), far-right LAOS and to a lesser extent Independent Greeks. But although the bourgeoisie to a great degree rallied to ND, even this electoral performance was its second worst of the past 30 years.
The vote for ND was essentially ‘negative’. According to one Public Issue survey, 1 in 5 ND voters (18%) cast their ballot “in order for Greece to remain in the euro area”, 1 in 12 (8%) “in order for there to be stability” and 1 in 10 (10%), mainly (former) PASOK and Democratic Left voters, for tactical reasons (“to prevent SYRIZA from winning”).
ND’s social base
The mass support for ND in the repeat elections of June came chiefly (59%) from socio-economic categories of the inactive population (pensioners, housewives), who are traditionally more conservative but also proved to be most vulnerable to the propaganda, as well as the rural strata (36% in farming areas, compared to 28% in urban centers – farming/urban difference +8%). The highest percentage of support for ND was from pensioners (42%) and housewives (37%). In contrast, its voter share among the salaried employees was very low (19-21%) (figure 2).
Moreover, the party won the most votes among the wider employer group and the self-employed, where it traditionally prevails. Due to the class polarization, it again rallied a segment of these voters (28%) and managed, marginally, to hold on to first place. However, its support in the specific socio-economic category was much weaker compared to what ND had enjoyed during the period of its political predominance, 2004-2007 (46-49%), or in 2009 for that matter, when it lost to PASOK (33%). But what is even more characteristic is the fact that between the two electoral contests, ND showed the highest increase in the category of the ‘financially secure’ (38%, +16%). These are the social strata which have not been badly hit by the economic crisis or have even benefited.
In demographic terms, ND’s voter base is decidedly aged. Among voters aged 65 and over, ND secured 48% (1 in 2 voters of this age group), while among those aged 55-64, 33% (1 in 3). These two age groups account for 63% of ND’s voters. It is worth noting in this respect that the 65+ age group is the only one in which support for the (old) two-partyism remained at relatively high levels (67%).
The geography of the social polarization
The strong social differentiation at the base of the political parties is also vividly reflected in the electoral geography of the Athens urban area and clearly corresponds to the region’s social-class division along the NE-SW axis. New Democracy prevailed in the compact zone of northern and north-eastern municipalities as well as in the south-eastern coastal zone of the capital, which have the highest concentration of middle and upper-middle strata (figure 1). In many of these areas, ND’s voter support exceeded 30% in June, while in the most affluent suburbs, on account of the class rallying, it ranged from 50% to 70%. In Ekali in May, ND won 31.6% of the vote, Drasi 21%, DIXA 8.9%, ANEL 6.9%, DISY 5.4% and Golden Dawn 3.9%. In June however, ND received 70% and SYRIZA just 6.5% (against 4.8% in May).
One year on
According to Public Issue’s estimate of voter support in the first half of 2013, ND’s share ranged from 27.5% to 29.5% (figure 3). It is interesting to note that, although the previous two Memorandums had proved to be catastrophic for the parties that oversaw them, this time ND survived the third Memorandum in opinion polls, whilst the agreement on the restructuring of Greek debt (PSI, December 2012) eased social discord. Even the Cyprus crisis (March 2013) demonstrated, once again, that fear operates in ND’s favor, just as it had done in June 2012.
One year on, the social profile of the party’s electoral base has not changed significantly. Despite the policy of pension cuts, its losses in the 65+ age group have been minimal. Moreover, ND has become stronger among the wider employer group and the self-employed, whilst its losses among the rural population, as recorded in the first quarter of the year, proved to be temporary (figure 2).
But the most important change can be seen elsewhere. For ND has managed to impressively redress its unprecedented lack of support among young people (18-24), which had been recorded in the elections at its expense and in favor of Golden Dawn, markedly strengthening (+13%) its social support in this age group (presently 24%). The same happens with a significant segment of the “silent” student mass. It seems that the changes being promoted in the Universities have enhanced the formation of a conservative bloc of students, a phenomenon that does not necessarily appear in the student elections outcome (figure 2).
At the time (11/6/13) the government spokesman announced the decision to shut down state broadcaster ERT, the balance of political forces between the main ruling party and the main opposition party appeared to be in favor of the former at the most auspicious levels since the last elections in June 2012 (a lead of 2 percentage points).
However, the high-risk political initiative taken by the premier did not meet with success. The overwhelming majority of public opinion, including one-third of ND’s own voters, strongly condemned the termination of ERT’s TV and radio broadcasts. The dynamics of the crisis within the government is currently in progress and the problems will not easily go away. At the present time, it is not possible to assess the magnitude of the electoral damage caused not only to ND but also to the standing of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, nor to say whether the party will lose its (until recently, secure) top spot in terms of voting intentions.
“restructuring, change, enlargement”
The multi-faceted crisis and splintering of the Right seen in the elections of 2012 continues today. In the battle of the parties for the legacy of the post-dictatorship conservative bloc, Golden Dawn has showed itself, since the elections, to be ND’s strongest, if not only adversary. For this reason, the party’s recent expressed commitment to strive toward “restructuring, change, enlargement”, as announced at ND’s 9th party conference in late June, will not be diverting its steady turn to the right.
Meanwhile, an attempt at enlargement from two directions, e.g. with the rumored return of LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis and/or the enlistment of cadres from PASOK, would most likely not bolster ND electorally but remain a symbolic move at the top level which would merely serve to confirm a convergence that has already been accomplished. Indeed, the remnants of LAOS’ supporters had already been absorbed by ND in the June 2012 elections. The same is true regarding the electoral shift of the politically liberal segment of center-left voters of PASOK and DIMAR (approximately 2-2.5% of the electorate), who in June had turned to ND in order to prevent a SYRIZA victory (a phenomenon known as ‘tactical voting’).
In a nutshell, ND’s primacy in the next elections may – at the moment and on the basis of things as they stand – appear more likely, but under no circumstances is it assured. It will depend, above all, on the outcome of the ‘battle for the far right’.
Date of publication: 25/06/2013
Publication:Newspaper “ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΤΑΚΤΩΝ”