Analysis
byYIANNIS MAVRIS
In November 2011, the decision of New Democracy MP for Athens B, Panos Kammenos, to vote against the government of Lucas Papademos in a vote of confidence resulted in his expulsion from ND’s parliamentary group. Three months later, on 24 February 2012, on his personal social networking accounts, on Facebook and Twitter, Kammenos announced the founding of a new party.
Independent Greeks (ANEL) arrived on the scene during the period in which the two-party system that had taken shape since the fall of the dictatorship was in a state of collapse and conservative voters were openly relinquishing their historical party identities. It should be noted that by the time ANEL was founded, it is known from public opinion polls that voter support for the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) had already plummeted and the standing of its leader, GeorgiosKaratzaferis, was in tatters as a result of his participation in the coalition government. At the same time, the conjuncture for ANEL and its leader proved to be inauspicious, for the rise of Golden Dawn (XA) had already begun, absorbing part of the social and political discontent of right-wing voters(figure 1).
Although in existence for less than three months – with many “likes” (on social media) but without any real organization or members – and despite the fact it lacked prominent political cadres, with the exception of its leader, ANEL attracted a sizeable portion of the right-wing protest vote (figure 2).It emerged from elections in May as the fourth largest party, with 10.6% and 671,000 votes, for a few days holding 33 seats in parliament. With electoral support nationwide, the party polled over 10% in six of the country’s 13 regions. In the South Aegean, from where Kammenos hails, ANEL garnered 15.8%, making it the second strongest party after ND and outstripping not only PASOK but also SYRIZA. The ‘origins’ of ANEL’s voters are quite similar to those of Golden Dawn: Nearly 1 in 2 (47%) were from ND, less than 1 in 5 (17%) from PASOK and 7% from LAOS.
But this forceful appearance in the party arena was short-lived. The ensuing polarization in the intervening period between May and June resulted in the significant contraction of ANEL’s newly acquired electoral audience by approximately one-third (-3.1%). In the repeat elections, the party suffered losses on both sides, though it managed to retain (a still fairly sizeable) 7.5% and 462,000 votes, giving ANEL 20 seats in parliament.
The fact that ANEL’s voter support subsequently declined markedly, in contrast with Golden Dawn which retained its electoral strength, demonstrated from the outset that the vote for ANEL was less cohesive than the vote for XA. In June, the newly founded party of PanosKammenos managed to rally just 53% of those who had voted for the party in May, compared to 94% in the case of ND, 85% for SYRIZA, 79% for PASOK and – more importantly – 70% for XA. Of the votes lost by ANEL, 21% went to SYRIZA, 16% to ND and 5% to XA.
Electoral geography
In May, the party’s strongest showings in the country’s regions were (apart from S. Aegean) in Central Greece (12.1%), Attica (11.4%) and Macedonia, both Central (11.5%) and West (10.5%), whilst its weakest (<8%) were in Epirus (7.7%), the Ionian Islands (7.8%) and the Peloponnese (7.9%)(figure 3). This latter was the only region in which XA surpassed ANEL in May with 9.6%. In June however, XA received more votes than ANEL in three, with West Greece and the Ionian Islands now being added to the Peloponnese. The battle of the parties for the legacy of the populist Right had begun. In June, ANEL did not poll over 10% anywhere, suffering losses everywhere (the greatest in S. Aegean -6.2%, which however continued to return the party’s highest vote share). After the contraction of support, the party’s strongest prefectures were still Drama (10.1%), Kastoria (10%), Cyclades (9.6%), Dodecanese (9.6%) and Attica (9.5%).
The comparative examination of the electoral geography of the two main breakaway parties of the Right (ANEL, XA) reveals similarities with respect to the distribution of their voter support in Attica, Central Greece, Epirus, Thessaly and Crete. On the other hand, major differences can be seen in Macedonia (especially East Macedonia), Thrace, the Aegean Islands and particularly the Peloponnese. There, unlike XA, ANEL’s voter support was very low and the party failed to seriously threaten ND’s primacy.
Social characteristics of ANEL’s electoral support
In the peripheral municipalities of the Attica basin in May, ND was literally crushed, polling just 12.4% in Athens B and 9.8% in Piraeus B. The conservative camp was deeply fragmented, whilst in the municipalities of the western zone, with a predominantly working class and low income social composition, the splintering, between ND, ANEL and XA was striking: In Peristeri, ND polled only 9.9%, XA 8.4% and ANEL 10.8%, in Aigaleo, ND garnered 10.3%, XA 7.9% and ANEL 11.6%, whilst this pattern was repeated in the peripheral municipalities of Piraeus, e.g. in Keratsini (ND 8.7%, XA 9.4%, ANEL 12.6%) and Nikaia (ND 8.9%, XA 8.7%, ANEL 11.4%). Overall, the party of PanosKammenos polled over 10% in 98 of the 122 municipalities and communities of Attica, over 15% in nine and over 25% in two (MarkopouloOropou 28.5% and Aspropyrgos 25.6%). Its highest shares of the vote were in predominantly low income and working class districts (Kamatero 13.2%, AgiaVarvara 12.8%, Ilion 12.1%) and its lowest in predominantly middle-class districts (Filothei5.1%, Psychico 6.1%, Ekali 6.9%).
At the same time however, ANEL’s electoral support in May was not confined only to low income districts. The party attracted equally strong support in the affluent suburbs of the southern and coastal zone (Kallithea 13%, Alimos 12.3%, Glyfada 12%, PalaioFaliro 11.9%), with the result that its social appeal appeared relatively ‘horizontal’. However, the party failed to retain this increased support in June. In areas of the middle and upper conservative strata, which had initially supported ANEL, ND’s rallying of support and the shift of voters to that party were greater in the repeat elections. In municipalities such as Kallithea, NeaSmyrni, P. Faliro and Glyfada, ANEL lost 35-37% of the voter support it had achieved in May. In contrast, the party managed to retain much of its strength in low income-working class districts (Peristeri, Aigaleo, Keratsini, Nikaia) where its losses were limited to 24-29%.
After the elections
ANEL does not have the same degree of ideological cohesion as Golden Dawn. The difference revealed by the ideological self-placement of the two parties’ voters is plain to see (figure 4).The electoral support secured by ANEL in elections in 2012 has proven to be somewhat precarious. At the same time however, the political repercussions of the Memorandum have clearly not dissipated. The very deep social, political and ideological division caused by the bailout deal has by no means been absorbed(figure 5). Quite the opposite.
Prior to the two parliamentary elections in 2012, Independent Greeks constituted the largest breakup of ND’s electoral base, which was caused by the implementation of the Memorandum, with the appearance of Golden Dawn being a secondary aspect of this process. After the elections, the roles were reversed. In the 12 months since elections, ANEL has been pushed aside by Golden Dawn, which has assumed the mantle of principal breakaway. ANEL is now the secondary dimension of the aforesaid breakup, without this meaning that the party’s voter support does not remain sizeable. On account of its social characteristics, the party’s appeal has exhibited notable resilience in the 12 months since elections, despite the feud that broke out among its leadership in December 2012. One year after elections, ANEL’s voter support may have declined (in the past two months it has stood at around 6% – figure 1), but the party appears to be socially crystallized. In conditions of intensifying social crisis, not only the electoral survival of Independent Greeks, but also the strengthening of Golden Dawn, make the ongoing undertaking to regenerate the main party of the conservative camp, ND, a quite difficult one.
Date of publication: 02/07/2013
Publication: Newspaper “ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΔΑ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΤΑΚΤΩΝ”